Let n be a positive integer, c a real positive constant, and p(n) = c/n. Let U n,p be the random unary predicate under the linear order, and S c the almost sure theory of U n, c n . We show that for every first-order sentence φ:
Introduction
Let n be a positive integer, and 0 ≤ p(n) ≤ 1. The random unary predicate U n,p is a probability space over predicates U on [n] = {1, . . . , n} with the probabilities determined by Pr[U (x)] = p(n), for 1 ≤ x ≤ n, and the events U (x) are mutually independent over 1 ≤ x ≤ n. U n,p is also called the random bit string.
Let φ be a first-order sentence in the language with linear order and the unary predicate. In [7] , Shelah and Spencer showed that for every such sentence φ and for Let S = c S c be the set of all sentences that are true in every almost sure theory. We show:
Theorem 2 For every real, positive c, S c = S.
Other interesting structures that have also been examined in this fashion are random graphs (without order) with edge probability p(n) = c/n and p(n) = ln n/n+ c/n (see the work of Lynch, Spencer, and Thoma: [5] , [6] , and [9] ). We achieve a simpler characterization of the limit probabilities than those for random graphs due to our underlying models.
To prove these theorems, we look first at the countable models of the almost sure theories (for more on this, see [8] ). Let M |= S c be such a model. Each of these models satisfy a set of basic axioms ∆ (defined in Section 3). Further, we show, using Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games, that ∆ ∪ {σ i } is complete, where σ i is the firstorder sentence that states "there are exactly i elements for which the unary predicate holds." For every M, there is an i such that M |= ∆ ∪ {σ i }. For each first-order sentence φ, either φ follows from only a finite number of complete extensions, or the negation of φ, ¬φ, follows from only a finite number of complete extensions. Let X be the number of elements for which the unary predicate holds in U n, c n . The Pr[X = i] has binomial distribution. These two facts give the desired form for f φ (c) in Theorem 1 and are used to show Theorem 2.
In an effort to keep the paper self-contained and accessible, we have included many definitions and concepts that the expert in the field might wish to skip. Section 2 of this paper includes definitions from logic and finite model theory. To illustrate the definitions, we have included a section of Examples (Section 3). Section 4 includes the proofs of the results.
A note on notation: we will use lower case Greek letters for first-order sentences (φ, ψ, . . .), upper case Greek letters for sets of sentences (Γ, ∆, . . .), and lower case Roman letters to refer to elements in the universe (i, j, . . .).
Definitions
This section contains the definitions we need from first-order logic and finite model theory. A more thorough treatment of first-order logic can be found in Enderton [4] , of finite model theory in Ebbinhaus and Flum [3] , and of the probabilistic method in Alon, Spencer, and Erdős [1] .
We concentrate on first-order logic over the basic operations {≤, U, =}. That is, we are interested in sentences made up of = (equality), ≤ (linear order), U (an unary predicate), the binary connectives ∨ (disjunction) and ∧ (conjunction), ¬ (negation), and the first-order quantifiers ∃ (existential quantification) and ∀ (universal quantification). "First-order" refers to the range of the quantifiers-we only allow quantification over variables, not sets of variables. For example,
is a first-order sentence that expresses the property that there is a least element. The x and y are assumed to range over elements of the universe. A set of consistent sentences is often called a theory.
Our structures have an underlying set [n] = {1, . . . , n} with the basic operations: =, ≤ and U . Without loss of generality, we will interpret the ordering ≤ as the natural ordering on [n] . There are many choices for interpreting the unary predicate U over [n] (2 n to be precise). We can view the structures as ordered sequences of 0's and 1's, where the ith element in the sequence is 1 if and only if U (i). For example, if n = 5 and the unary predicate holds on the least element, then structure can be represented
be models where ≤ is a linear order on the universes (the underlying sets) of the structure, and U, U 1 , and U 2 are unary predicates on the universes of their respective structure. We will say M models ψ (written: M |= ψ) just in case the property ψ holds of M. If for every model M we have M |= Γ implies M |= ψ, where Γ is a (possibly empty) set of sentences, then we write Γ |= ψ (pronounced "Γ models ψ"). While many things can be expressed using first-order sentences, many cannot. For example, there is no first-order sentence that captures the property that a structure has an universe with an even number of elements (see [3] , p. 21). That is, there is no first-order sentence φ such that for every model
One measure of the complexity of first-order sentences is the nesting of quantifiers. If a formula φ has no quantifiers, we say it has quantifier rank 0, and write qr(φ) = 0. For all formulas, we define quantifier rank by induction:
• If φ = ¬φ 1 , then qr(φ) = qr(φ 1 ).
• If φ = ∃xφ 1 or φ = ∀xφ 1 , then qr(φ) = qr(φ 1 ) + 1.
Definition 1 For each t, two models M 1 and M 2 are equivalent (with respect to t),
M 1 ≡ t M 2 if
they have the same truth value on all first-order sentences of quantifier rank at most t.
The equivalence of structures under all first-order sentences of quantifier rank less than or equal to t is connected to the t-pebble games of Ehrenfeucht and Fraisse, described in [3] . Given two structures M 1 and M 2 , M 1 ≡ t M 2 if and only if the second player has a winning strategy for every t-pebble Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game played on M 1 and M 2 . We define the game below: • Equipment: We have t pairs of pebbles and the two structures M 1 and M 2 as game boards.
Definition 2 The t-pebble
• Moves: The players take turns moving. At the ith move, the Spoiler chooses a structure and places his ith pebble on an element in that structure. Duplicator then places her ith pebble on an element in the other structure.
•
Winning: If after any of Duplicator's moves, the substructures induced by the pebbles are not isomorphic, then Spoiler wins. After both players have played t moves, if Spoiler has not won, then Duplicator wins.
We say a player has a winning strategy for the t-pebble game on M 1 and M 2 , if no matter how the opponent plays, the player can always win. These games form a powerful tool for showing theories are complete. A theory T is complete if for every sentence φ, either T |= φ or T |= ¬φ. Equivalently, a theory T is complete if any two models of T satisfy the same first order sentences. For each q, we can show this for sentences of quantifier rank q by proving that Duplicator has a winning strategy for the q-move EF game on any two models of T . We will use this reduction to games to show the completeness of our theories S c (see Lemma 1).
Examples
To give some intuition about what these models and theories look like, we begin with an informal discussion of T 0 and T 1 . When p(n) n −1 , almost surely the unary predicate never holds (i.e. no 1's occur). To see this, let A i be the event that U (i) holds, X i be the random indicator variable, and X = i X i , the total number of 1's that occur (i.e. the total number of elements for which the unary predicate holds). Then, E(X i ) = p(n), and by linearity of expectation,
The negation of this statement, (∀x)¬U (x), almost surely is true. So, (∀x)¬U (x) is in the almost sure theory T 0 .
The almost sure theory also contains sentences about the ordering. Since every U n,p is linearly ordered with a minimal and maximal element, the first-order sentences that state these properties are in T 0 , T 1 , and each S c . Let Γ l be the order axioms for the linear theory, that is, the sentences:
The following sentences guarantee that there is a minimal element and a maximal element:
Further, every element, except the maximal element, has a unique successor under the ordering, and every element, except the minimal element, has a unique predecessor. This can be expressed in the first-order language as:
As n → ∞, the number of elements also goes to infinity. To capture this, we add, for each positive r, the axiom:
For n ≥ r, U n,p |= δ r . Thus, for every U n,p , For T 0 , the only additional axiom we need is (∀x)(¬U (x)). The simplest model of T 0 is an infinite decreasing chain of 0's followed by an infinite increasing chain of 0's (see Figure 1) . More complicated models also satisfy Σ ∪ (∀x)(¬U (x)), namely those with arbitrarily many copies of of chains of 0's, ordered like the integers (called "Z-chains"), with an infinite decreasing chain of 0's at the beginning and an infinite increasing chain of 0's at the end. The ordering of the Z-chains is not determined. It could be finite, infinite with discrete points, or it could be "dense." By the latter, we mean that between any 2 Z-chains, there's another.
When n −1 p(n) n −1/2 , almost surely isolated 1's occur. Using the notation above, we have E(X) → ∞ as n → ∞. Since all the events are independent, Var[X] ≤ E [X] . By the Second Moment Method (see [1] , chapter 4 for details),
→ 0 the electronic journal of combinatorics 4 (1997) #R23 For models of T 1 , we cannot have a single infinite chain, since all the 1's must be isolated. So, we must have infinitely many Z-chains that contain a single 1. Between these can be any number of Z-chains that contain no 1's. Call any Z-chain that contains a 1 distinguished. For any distinguished Z-chain, except the maximal distinguished chain, almost surely, there's a least distinguished Z-chains above it (this follows from the discreteness of the finite models). In other words, every distinguished Z-chain, except the maximal 1, has a distinguished successor Z-chain. This rules out a "dense" ordering of the distinguished Z-chains and leads to a "discreteness" of 1's, similar to the discreteness of elements we encountered above. It says nothing about Z-chains without 1's-those could have any countable order type they desire. So, the simplest model is pictured in Figure 2 .
By the earlier discussion, we know that the basic axioms Σ ⊂ T 1 . The only further axioms needed are those that guarantee arbitrarily many 1's occurring far apart and the "discreteness" of 1's. These axioms echo the basic axioms listed before, for each 
These axioms, along with Σ, axiomatize T 1 , which follows from an EF game argument. When p = c/n, the expected number of 1's in U n, c n is (using the notation from above):
In fact, Pr[X = t] has binomial distribution and the limiting probability is Poisson (see Lemma 3). So, with probability Pr[X = t] → e −c c t t!
, U n, c n has exactly t 1's. In any countable model of the almost sure theory, S c , the 1's occur arbitrarily far apart, as in models of T 1 . A simple model of S c , which occurs with probability e −c c 2 2! is in Figure 3 . Let ∆ be the axioms Σ along with the axiom schema r for every r that guarantees the 1's are isolated (that is, ∆ = Σ ∪ r { r }). For each S c , ∆ ⊂ S c .
The Results
For each natural number i, let σ i be the first-order sentence that says "there exist exactly i 1's." So,
Recall that we defined the set of sentences S to be all sentences that hold in every almost sure theory (that is, S = c S c ). Then:
Lemma 1 For each i, S ∪ {σ i } is complete.
Proof: Note that the basic axioms ∆ (defined in Section 3) are contained in S. So, it suffices to show that ∆ ∪ {σ i } is complete (that is for every sentence φ, either ∆ ∪ {σ i } |= φ or ∆ ∪ {σ i } |= ¬φ). We will show this is a complete theory by giving, for every t, a winning strategy for Duplicator for the t-move game on two models, M 1 and M 2 of ∆ ∪ {σ i }. The essence of the proof is that in our theories the 1's are spaced arbitrarily far apart. So, what matters in pebble placement is the distance to the closest 1. Since t pebbles can only tell distances of length ≤ 2 t , we define the t-type of an interval to keep track of small distances from 1's.
Let the t-type of an interval Lastly, assume a + 2 t−1 ≤ x ≤ b + 2 t−1 but no y such that U (x + y) and −2 t−1 < y < 2 t−1 exists. Then x is at least 2 t−1 from a, b, and every i such that U (i). This gives L r = R l = Z l = Z r = MANY t−1 . As before, the values of L l and R r depend on L and R (since they count the distance from endpoints that did not move). So, we only need for our choice of x that it is at least 2 Proof: Let φ be a first-order sentence. Let t = qr(φ), the quantifier rank of φ. We claim that either max{i ∈ M (φ)} < 3 t or max{i ∈ M (¬φ)} < 3 t . Assume not. Then, there exists i, j > 3 t such that i ∈ M (φ) and j ∈ M (¬φ). For the second case of ¬φ ∧ t∈M (φ) σ t , we have the finite disjunction of (¬φ ∧ σ t ), for t ∈ M (φ), each of which has limit probability 0. So, 
